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DISABILITY AND EMPLOYMENT 
DISCRIMINATION AT THE REHNQUIST 
COURT 
Anita Silvers"' 
Michael E. Waterstone·· & Michael Ashley Stein••• 
INTRODUCTION 
This symposium celebrates, examines, and raises chal-
lenges on the :fifteenth anniversary of the Americans with 
Disabilities Act (ADA).1 It also presents an opportunity to 
consider another important legal milestone, namely, the end of 
the Rehnquist Court. 2 While it is too early to fully assess its 
twenty-year legacy, much attention has already been paid to 
that Court's federalism jurisprudence.3 Receiving less scrutiny 
• Professor of Philosophy, San Francisco State University. 
•• Assistant Professor, University of Mississippi School of Law. 
- Visiting Professor, Harvard Law School; Professor, William & Mary School 
of Law. 
1 42 u.s.c. §§ 12101-12213 (2000). 
• The late Honorable William H. Rehnquist was appointed as Chief Justice of 
the United States Supreme Court in 1986. See U.S. Supreme Court Justices, 
available at http://www.oyez.org/oyez/resourcellegal_entity/100/ (last visited Mar. 6, 
2006). 
3 See, e.g., JOHN T. NOONAN, JR., NARROWING THE NATION'S POWER: THE 
SUPREME COURT SIDES WITH THE STATES (2002); Evan H. Camin.ker, "Appropriate" 
Means-Ends Constraints on Section 5 Powers, 53 STAN. L. REV. 1127, 1131 (2001) 
(noting additional pressure new federalism puts on Congress to legislate pursuant 
to its Section 5 powers); Roderick M. Hills, Jr., The Eleventh Amendment as Curb 
on Bureaucratic Power, 53 STAN. L. REv. 1225, 1225-26 (2001) (arguing that the 
Rehnquist Court's jurisprudence serves the public interest by maintaining a dam-
ages versus injunction distinction that serves as a check on public agencies); Vicki 
C. Jackson, Principle and Compromise in Constitutional Adjudication: The Elev-
enth Amendment and State Sovereign Immunity, 75 NOTRE DAME L. REv. 953 
(2000) ("The Court's Eleventh Amendment and sovereign immunity case law de-
945 
946 MISSISSIPPI LAW JOURNAL [Vol. 75 
has been the Rehnquist Court's general pattern of favoring 
plaintiffs in race and sex-based employment discrimination 
cases, while being decidedly pro-defendant in the parallel 
context of disability-related claims.4 
serves the condemnation and resistance of scholars."). 
• For Title VII, pro-employee cases, see Bazemore v. Friday, 478 385 (1986) 
(holding that statistical studies of salary discrimination are relevant for purposes 
of proving discrimination); see also Watson v. Fort Worth Bank & Trust, 487 U.S. 
977 (1988) (holding that subjective or discretionary employment practices can be 
analyzed under disparate impact framework); Price Waterhouse v. Hopkins, 490 
U.S. 228 (1989) (holding that when a Title VII plaintiff demonstrates that gender 
played a motivating part in an employment decision, the defendant could avoid a 
fmding of liability only by proving by a preponderance of the evidence that it 
would not have made the same decision even if it had not taken the plaintiffs 
gender into account); Robinson v. Shell Oil Co., 519 U.S. 337 (1997) (holding that 
term "employees" in Title VII must include former employees); Desert Palace, Inc. 
v. Costa, 539 U.S. 90 (2003) (holding that an employee does not need to present 
direct evidence for reasonable jury to conclude that an employment practice was 
illuminated by a discriminatory motivating factor). To be sure, a significant ex-
ception to the Rehnquist Court's broadening of Title VII rights was Wards Cove 
Packing Co. u. Atonia, 490 U.S. 642 (1989), superseded by statute, Civil Rights Act 
of 1991, Pub. L. No. 102-166, 105 Stat. 1074, as recognized in Raytheon Co. v. 
Hernandez, 540 U.S. 44 (2003), where the Court sharply restricted a plaintiff's 
ability to demonstrate, using the disparate impact proof structure, that an 
employer's policy favored whites over non-whites. Our point, however, is to iden-
tify trends and parallels. For ADA Title I pro-employer cases, see Sutton v. Unit-
ed Airlines, 527 U.S. 471 (1999) (holding that in considering whether an individu-
al's impairment substantially limits one or more major life activities, courts 
should consider the individual in their mitigated state; moreover, under the "re-
garded as" prong of the defmition of disability, an employer must view the indi-
vidual as unable to work a class or range of jobs, not just one particular job); see 
also Murphy v. UPS, Inc., 527 U.S 516 (same); Toyota Motor Manufacturing, 
Kentucky v. Williams, 534 U.S. 184 (2002) (holding that in considering the major 
life activity of performing manual tasks, courts should only consider activities that 
are of central importance to most people's daily lives); Clackamas v. Gastroenter-
ology Associates, P.C. v. Wells, 538 U.S. 440 (2003) (holding that clinic did not 
have requisite number of employees for ADA coverage because physicians were 
not employees); Albertson's Inc. v. Kirkinburg, 527 U.S. 555 (1999) (holding that 
an employer can show that an individual is not qualified for a job because that 
individual cannot meet a legitimate qualification standard, even if the standard is 
not, in and of itself, essential to the job); US Airways v. Barnett, 535 U.S. 391 
(2002) (holding that ADA's reasonable accommodation requirement did not require 
employer to make exceptions to seniority system); Raytheon Co. v. Hernandez, 
540 U.S. 44 (2003) (holding that employer's policy of refusing to rehire former 
employees who had violated its misconduct rules was a legitimate, non-disability-
based reason); Board of Trustees v. University of Alabama v. Garrett, 531 U.S. 
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Various explanations have been proffered to explain this 
differential treatment. Some commentators aver a backlash 
against the disabled;5 others point to the vague definition of 
disability contained in the statute.6 Almost all scholars agree 
that as a civil rights statute, the ADA is viewed by courts 
differently than its predecessor, the Civil Rights Act of 1964 
(Title V11).7 Indeed, nearly all legal commentators, even those 
supportive of disability-based employment rights, concur with 
this position. 8 To quote one assessment: "the ADA is not an 
antidiscrimination law" for it mandates "firms to treat un-
equal people equally, thus discriminating in favor of the dis-
356 (2001) (holding that state employers were not subject to damage suits under 
Title I of the ADA based on Eleventh Amendment principles of sovereign immuni-
ty). The one Rehnquist Court ADA Title I case that was decided in favor of the 
plaintiff was Cleveland v. Policy Management Systems Corp., 526 U.S. 795 (1999) 
(holding that plaintiff who had claimed that she could not work in Social Security 
Disability Insurance application was not estopped from arguing she was disabled 
under ADA). 
5 See generally Symposium, Backlash Against the ADA: Interdisciplinary Per-
spectives and Implications for Social Justice Strategies, 21 BERKELEY J. EMP. & 
LAB. L. 1 (2000). 
6 See Robert L. Burgdorf, Jr., "Substantially Limited" Protection from Disabili-
ty Discrimination: The Special Treatment Model and Misconstructions of the Defi-
nition of Disability, 42 VILL. L. REV. 409, 415 (1997) (discussing the courts' mis-
constructions of the ADA's definition of disability); see also Chai R. Feldblum, 
Definition of Disability Under Federal Anti-Discrimination Law: What Happened? 
Why? And What Can We Do About It?, 21 BERKELEY J. EMP. & LAB. L. 91, 91-92, 
(2000); Arlene B. Mayerson, Restoring Regard for the "Regarded As" Prong: Giving 
Effect to Congressional Intent, 42 VILL. L. REv. 587, 587 (1997) (acknowledging 
"the narrowing construction of the defmition of disability which thereby deprives 
qualified ;ndividua!s of the opportunity to prove that they have been discriminat-
ed against in violation of the ADA"); Aviam Soifer, The Disability Term: Dignity, 
Default, and Negative Capability, 47 UCLA L. REV. 1279, 1299-1307 (2000) (dis-
cussing courts' restrictive interpretations of the "regarded as" defmition); Bonnie 
Poitras Tucker, The Supreme Court's Definition of Disability Under the ADA: A 
Return to the Dark Ages, 52 ALA. L. REv. 321, 325-26 (2000) (detailing legislative 
history that supports determining disability without considering mitigating mea-
sures and the courts' contrary decisions). 
1 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000e et seq. (2000). 
8 One commentator went so far as to use the term "canonical" to describe 
this view. See Christine Jolls, Antidiscrimination and Accommodation, 115 HARv. 
L. REV. 642, 643-44 (2001). For a detailed rebuttal, see Michael Ashley Stein, 
Some Struggle, Different Difference: ADA Accommodations as Antidiscrimination, 
153 U. PA. L. REv. 579 (2004). 
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abled. "9 This last, overarching issue is crucial for evaluating 
the ADA. 
In this Article, we treat the convergence of the fifteenth 
anniversary of the ADA and the end of the Rehnquist Court 
(until recently, the only Supreme Court to adjudicate ADA 
issues)10 as an opportunity to demonstrate how that Court 
took a lead in treating disability discrimination cases differ-
ently than those based on race and sex. We show that far from 
treating equal people equally, there are circumstances in 
which the Court has treated similarly situated nondisabled 
and disabled people differently, to the disadvantage of the 
latter. 
To illustrate this point, we set forth the Rehnquist Court's 
approach to paternalistic notions that "protect" female workers 
and workers with disabilities by contrasting the assumptions 
underlying and influencing the decisions in UA W v. Johnson 
Controls, Inc. 11 with Chevron U.S.A., Inc. v. Echazabal. 12 Al-
though the cases are not exactly parallel-notably, the govern-
ing legal standards differ--examining their respective method-
ologies provides insight into the Rehnquist Court's view that 
disability-based exclusion from the workplace is fundamental-
ly different from exclusion on the basis of race or sex.13 Put 
9 Sherwin Rosen, Disability Accommodation and the Labor Market, in DIS-
ABILITY AND WORK: INCENTIVES, RIGHTS, AND OPPORTUNITIES 18, 21 (Carolyn L. 
Weaver ed., 1991). 
10 On January 10, 2006, the Roberts Court announced its first ADA decision. 
See United States v. Georgia, 126 S. Ct. 877, 882 (2006) (holding that "insofar as 
Title II creates a private cause of action for damages against the States for con-
duct that actually violates the Fourteenth Amendment, Title II validly abrogates 
state sovereign immunity''). 
11 499 u.s. 187 (1991). 
12 536 u.s. 73 (2002). 
13 Viewing race and sex discrimination as different from discrimination on the 
basis of disability predates the ADA. This position first emerged most prominently 
in Cleburne u. Cleburne Liuing Center, 473 U.S. 432, 446 (1985) (holding that 
state discrimination on the basis of disability receives rational basis review). For 
a discussion of Cleburne as demonstrating judicial hostility to disability-based dis-
crimination claims, see Anita Silvers & Michael Ashley Stein, From Plessy (1896) 
and Goesart (1948) to Cleburne (1985) and Garrett (2001): A Chill Wind from the 
Past Blows Equal Protection Away, in BACKLASH AGAINST THE ADA: REINTERPRET-
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another way, by contrasting the Court's varied methodologies, 
we make concrete Ronald Dworkin's famous observation that 
judges interpret law so as to fit and justify their choices from 
among the existing legallandscape.14 
This article proceeds in four parts. Part I briefly sets forth 
the history and importance of patemalism and the law. Next, 
Part II describes the jurisprudential shift in the treatment of 
women over the course of the Twentieth Century from a model 
of patemalism to one that acknowledges women's equality and 
autonomy, culminating in the Court's decision in Johnson 
Controls. Part III tums to the different course of disability 
discrimination, setting forth each of the rulings in the 
Echazabal litigation, and critiquing the Court's opinion. In 
Part IV, we conclude by arguing that the Rehnquist Court's 
failure to reject patemalistic notions of "protecting" people 
with disabilities (in this case, from themselves) is inconsistent 
with its race and sex antidiscrimination jurisprudence, and 
misapprehends the larger purposes of the ADA. 
I. PATERNALISM AND THE LAW 
A standard dictionary definition of "patemalism" is "the 
care or control of subordinates (as by a government or employ-
er) in a fatherly manner. "15 Historically, the phrase was used 
in reference to the government acting in the guise of one's 
actual father, 16 to secure its citizens' best interests.17 Exten-
!NG D!S,\_liil.TTV RIGHTS (CORPOREALITIES: DISCOURSES ON DISABILITIES) 221 (Linda 
Hamilton Krieger ed., 2003) [hereinafter Chill Wind]. 
•• Ronald Dworkin, Hard Cases, 88 HARv. L. REv. 1057, 1063 (1975) ("Law-
yers believe that when judges make new law their decisions are constrained by 
legal traditions but are nevertheless personal and original."). 
16 WEBSTER'S THIRD NEW INTERNATIONAL DICTIONARY 1654 (Philip Babcock 
Gove et. al. eds., 1986). 
16 The etymology is derived from the Latin word "pater," meaning father. See 
AMERICAN HERITAGE DICTIONARY 909 (2d ed. 1982). 
17 See, e.g., 3 A DICTIONARY OF AMERICAN ENGLISH 1695 (William A. Craigie 
& James R. Hulbert eds., 1941) ("A system of government in which the govern-
ment regulates the whole life of the nation."); 7 THE CENTURY DICTIONARY AND 
CYCLOPEDIA 4326 (1911) ("Paternal care or government; specifically, excessive 
governmental regulation of the private affairs and business methods of the people; 
950 MISSISSIPPI LAW JOURNAL [Vol. 75 
sion of the concept to additional contexts such as that of em-
ployment, is a more contemporary/8 and increasingly deroga-
tory, usage.19 
Feminist theory's identification of paternalism as a tool of 
patriarchy explains this metamorphosis. Because paternalism 
involves a power relationship in which the more powerful 
decide for the less powerful, paternalistic policy-making 
stands suspect of controlling those whose moral and political 
right of self-determination it vacates,20 frequently for the 
good of the policymakers themselves. 21 
Upholding paternalistic employment policies is not a new 
phenomenon in Supreme Court jurisprudence. More than a 
century ago, the Supreme Court proclaimed, infamously,22 in 
undue solicitude on the part of the central government for the protection of the 
people and their interests, and interference therewith."). 
18 See, e.g., THE NEW CENTURY DICTIONARY OF THE ENGLISH LANGUAGE 1260 
(H.G. Emery & K.G. Brewster eds., 1944); WEBSTER'S NEW INTERNATIONAL DICTio-
NARY 1791 (William Allen Neilson et. al. eds., 1950). 
19 See, e.g., THE DICTIONARY OF BIAS-FREE USAGE: A GUIDE TO NONDISCRIM-
INATORY LANGUAGE 211 (Rosalie Maggio ed., 1991) (noting that the term "is offen-
sive to many women and minorities"); ALAN & THERESA VON ALTENDORF, IsMS: A 
CoMPENDIUM OF CONCEPTS, DOCTRINES, TRAITS & BELIEFS 227 (1991) (stating that 
paternalism's prevalence contravenes ''the most fundamental freedom of the right 
to guide your own life . . . without being perpetually scolded like a child"). 
20 See, e.g., MARILYN FRENCH, BEYOND POWER: ON WOMEN, MEN AND MORALS 
(1986); Martha L. Fineman, Challenging Law, Establishing Differences: The Future 
of Feminist Legal Scholarship, 42 FLA. L. REV. 25 (1990). 
21 See The Online Ethics Center, at http://www.onlineethics.org/glossary.html 
#anchP (last visited Mar. 6, 2006) (defining paternalism "as violating a moral rule 
of conduct toward someone or limiting that person's self-determination . . . for 
what is perceived as being (in] that person's own benefit"). 
29 See, e.g., Barry Friedman, The History of the Countermajoritarian Difficulty, 
Part Three: The Lessons of Lochner, 76 N.Y.U. L. REv. 1383, 1383 (2001) (rebuff-
ing revisionist attempts at demonstrating the decision's legitimacy); David A 
Strauss, Why Was Lochner Wrong?, 70 U. Cm. L. REv. 373, 373 (2003) (opining 
that Lochner "would probably win the prize . . . for the most widely reviled deci-
sion of the last hundred years"). But see RICHARD A EPSTEIN, TAKINGS: PRIVATE 
PRoPERTY AND THE POWER OF EMINENT DOMAIN 128-29 (1985) (defending Lochner 
from a libertarian perspective); PAUL KENS, LOCHNER V. NEW YORK: ECONOMIC 
REGULATION ON TRIAL (1998) (analyzing the decision within the historical context 
of conflicting political ideologies and an incipient labor movement); David E. 
Bernstein, Lochner's Legacy, 82 TEX. L. REV. 1, 63-64 (2003). 
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Lochner v. New York23 that the freedom to contract one's own 
labor was a central tenet of liberty in a free society.24 That 
autonomous right, even when firmly grounded in the Equal 
Protection Clause25 was, however, neither unlimited nor uni-
versal. 26 In a series of decisions following Lochner, the Court 
upheld various limitations on women's occupational freedom, 
all on the professed public policy ground of protecting women 
due to their frail constitutions. Three years after the Lochner 
Court generally recognized freedom of contract, the Justices 
held in Muller v. Oregon27 that restricting the hours of 
women's employment was a valid exercise of the state's police 
power. 28 Without citing any evidence on the deleterious ef-
fects that working more than ten hours a day at a laundry 
would have, the Court stated that the restriction was warrant-
ed due to a "woman's physical structure and the performance 
of matemal functions" which "place her at a disadvantage" 
relative to man with whom "she is not an equal competitor."29 
Since "healthy mothers are essential to vigorous offspring," 
the Court reasoned that women's physical well-being was "an 
object of public interest and care."30 
Similar restrictions on the hours women could work, the 
wages they could eam, and the occupations they could hold, 
were subsequently upheld in a number of other cases. 31 Each 
23 198 u.s. 45 (1905). 
24 Id. at 53 ("The general right to make a contract in relation to his business 
is part of the liberty of the individual protected" under the Constitution.). 
25 U.S. C.QNS1'. amend. XIV. 
26 The freedom to contract was certainly prevalent, however, because the 
Lochner era Court invalidated some two hundred regulatory measures. See 
Strauss, supra note 22, at 373. 
27 208 u.s. 412 (1908). 
•a Id. at 422-23. The statute restricted the employment of any "female . . . in 
any mechanical establishment, or factory, or laundry for "more than ten hours" of 
any twenty-four hour cycle. /d. at 416 (quoting 1903 Or. Laws 148) . 
.. Id. at 421-22. 
30 Id. at 421. 
31 In Goesaert u. Cleary, for instance, the Supreme Court upheld a Michigan 
statute requiring that bartenders be licensed but prohibiting the licensing of wom-
en as "barmaids," unless they were either the spouses or daughters of male liquor 
establishment owners. 335 U.S. 464 (1948), overruled by Craig v. Boren, 429 U.S. 
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of these decisions relied on the broadly accepted, but factually 
unsubstantiated ground that women were relatively frail com-
pared to men.32 As a result, the state had a legitimate inter-
est both in protecting women's health, and by extension, the 
safety of members of the public who came into contact with 
them. 33 Hence, resting on apparently benign and patemalis-
tic considerations, the Supreme Court endorsed the restriction 
of women's workplace opportunities based on their biological 
difference, without real evidence that this difference rendered 
them exceptionally vulnerable. 34 
190 (1976). This was because only the "oversight" of a male with special interest 
in both the woman's welfare and the protection of bar room property, "assured 
through ownership of a bar by a barmaid's husband or father," could be trusted 
to "minimize[) hazards" otherwise confronting an unprotected barmaid. Id. at 466; 
see Chill Wind, supra note 13; Anita Silvers & Michael Ashley Stein, Disability, 
Equal Protection, and the Supreme Court: Standing at the Crossroads of Progres-
sive and Retrogressive Logic in Constitutional Classification, 35 U. MICH. J. L. 
REF. 81, 88-89 (2002) [hereinafter Standing at the Crossroads]. 
32 See generally Mary E. Becker, From Muller v. Oregon to Fetal Vulnerability 
Policies, 53 U. CHI. L. REv. 1219 (1986) (outlining sex-specific protectionist legisla-
tion); Judith Olans Brown et al., The Mythogenesis of Gender: Judicial Images of 
Women in Paid and Unpaid Labor, 6 UCLA WOMEN'S L.J. 457 (1996) (describing 
how traditional stereotypes about women have informed judicial decision-making); 
Laura Oren, Protection, Patriarchy, and Capitalism: The Politics of Gender Specific 
Regulation in the Workplace, 6 UCLA WOMEN'S L.J. 321 (1996) (comparing legisla-
tive limitations on women in the workplace in England during 1830-40 with those 
utilized in America from 1970-80). 
33 For example, in 1915 the Court upheld dual challenges to a California 
statute limiting the number of hours women could contract to work in Miller v. 
Wilson, 236 U.S. 373, 382 (1915) and in &sley v. McLaughlin, 236 U.S. 385, 394-
96 (1915). In the latter case, the Court reasoned that limiting the number of 
hours a woman could work as either a pharmacist or a student nurse was rea-
sonable in light of "the extreme importance to the public that it should not be 
performed by those who are suffering from over-fatigue." Id. at 392. 
34 The analogy of a parallel social convention, between women and individuals 
with disabilities, because of perceived biological differences, is one that several of 
the authors have made previously as part of a continuing research agenda. See 
Chill Wind, supra note 13, at 221; Standing at the Crossroads, supra note 31. 
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II. THE TREND TOWARDS AUTONOMY-UAW V. JOHNSON 
CONTROLS, INC. 
The framework for justifying women's exclusion from 
occupational opportunity on the basis of unfounded stereotypi-
cal assumptions was dramatically changed following passage 
of the Civil Rights Act of 1964.35 As elegantly explained in 
Weeks v. Southern Bell Telephone & Telegraph Co. :36 "Title 
VII rejects just this type of romantic paternalism as unduly 
Victorian and instead vests individual women with power to 
decide whether or not to take on unromantic tasks."37 Conse-
quently, previously held notions that automatically assigned 
women to certain occupational roles, and precluded their par-
ticipation in others based on stereotypes of their bodily defi-
ciency, were replaced by a standard which placed a heavy 
burden upon employers seeking their exclusion.38 
The Court's developing jurisprudence on the standards 
necessary to exclude women from the workplace reached an 
apotheosis in 1991 with UAW v. Johnson Controls.39 Defen-
35 Pub. L. No. 88-352, §§ 701-16, 78 Stat. 241, 253-66 (codified as amended at 
42 U.S.C. §§ 2000e et seq. (2000)). Concurrent with the Court's recognition of 
women's right to autonomy in the workplace, was judicial acknowledgment that 
women were also entitled to make decisions about their own health and well-
being. These rulings, whether based on constitutional, statutory, or common law 
principles, clearly rejected the notion that paternalism was a sufficient justifica-
tion for intervening in personal decision making. This is particularly evident in 
women's reproductive rights cases, as well as in the general health care context. 
See Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479 (1965) (prohibiting state from interfer-
ing with individual's ability to use contraceptives); see also Cruzan v. Mo. Dep't of 
Health, 497 U.S. 261 (1990) (holding that surrogate decision maker could refuse 
lifesaving treatment on behalf of patient if there was clear and convincing evi-
dence of patient's wishes); Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 959 (1973) (upholding woman's 
right to abortion); Eisenstadt v. Baird, 405 U.S. 438 (1972). 
36 408 F.2d 228 (5th Cir. 1969). 
37 Id. at 236. 
38 See, e.g., Mississippi Univ. for Women v. Hogan, 458 U.S. 718, 730 n.16 
(1982) (observing that the sex-based differential treatment was merely a codifica-
tion of empirically unsubstantiated social conventions); Frontiero v. Richardson, 
411 U.S. 677, 686 (1973) (holding as a general empirically verified proposition 
that one's sex was frequently unrelated "to ability to perform or contribute to 
society"). 
39 499 U.S. 187 (1991). 
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dant corporation was engaged in the manufacture of batteries, 
a central process of which exposed its workers to lead.40 In 
1982, Johnson Controls enacted a policy excluding all women 
"capable of bearing children," which it defined as every female 
employee "except those whose inability to bear children is 
medically documented," from any jobs which exposed them to 
lead.41 Further, the policy defined an unacceptable work sta-
tion as one below the critical level established by the Occupa-
tion Safety and Health Administration (OSHA) for safe re-
production by either sex. 42 A class action on behalf of "all 
past, present and future production and maintenance employ-
ees" was filed and successfully certified. 43 
At trial, the parties did not dispute that excessive lead 
exposure could result in "significant harm to persons. n« They 
differed, however, on whether the lead exposure at the John-
son Controls plant actually endangered fetuses, and if so, 
whether this risk was confined only to women workers. 45 
Each side proffered expert testimony, which also did not reach 
a consensus.46 The district court granted summary judgment 
40 ld. at 190. 
41 ld. at 192 (citation omitted). This policy departed from an earlier one in 
which fertile women wanting to work in jobs that brought them in proximity to 
lead were required to sign a statement indicating they had been apprised of the 
attendant risks. Id. at 191. 
02 ld. Specifically, thirty micrograms of lead per deciliter of blood or thirty 
micrograms of lead per cubic meter of air. See id. at 191-92 (citing 29 C.F.R. § 
1910.1025 (1990)). 
43 ld. at 192 (citation omitted). The class composition, which included both 
men and women, was arrived at by stipulation. Id. Among the named class repre-
sentatives were a woman who had chosen sterilization as a means of retaining 
her position, a post-menopausal divorcee who had been transferred from her posi-
tion to a lower paying one where she would not be exposed to lead, and a male 
employee who had been denied a leave of absence in order to lower his lead level 
prior to fathering children. See UAW v. Johnson Controls, Inc., 680 F. Supp. 309 
(E.D. Wis. 1988) [hereinafter Johnson Controls District Court], affd 886 F.2d 871 
(7th Cir. 1989), rev'd 499 U.S. 187 (1991). 
44 Johnson Controls District Court, 680 F. Supp. at 310. 
45 Id. 
48 ld. at 315. Dr. Whortin testified on behalf of the class that the OSHA 
standard "should generally protect adults of either sex from significant adverse 
effects," but admitted that high exposure could endanger a fetus. Id. at 311 (cita-
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for Johnson Controls, holding that although medical evidence 
on the effect of lead exposure on fetuses varied in relation to 
the level of exposure,47 "concem for society and future gener-
ations" impelled it to uphold Johnson Controls' fetal protection 
policy.48 Moreover, because "[t]here is a business necessity to 
protect fetuses,"49 the court held that Johnson Controls had 
sufficiently carried its burden of proof to invoke the business 
necessity defense.5° Consequently, the district court declined 
to undertake a Bona Fide Occupational Qualification (BFOQ) 
analysis. 51 
Sitting en banc,52 the Court of Appeals for the Seventh 
Circuit affirmed the grant of summary judgment on three 
grounds.53 First, the appellate court held that the business 
necessity defense (rather than BFOQ) was the proper one 
under which to evaluate defendant's fetal-protection policy.54 
In so ruling, it disagreed with the Fourth and the Eleventh 
Circuits, and created an inter-circuit conflict. 55 Applying that 
standard, it held that Johnson Controls was entitled to sum-
tion omitted). For Johnson Controls, Drs. Scialli and Chisolm and Professor Lega-
tor each testified that as a general principal fetuses were in danger of developing 
abnormalities from lead exposure: Dr Fishburn avowed that overexposure to lead 
could damage fetuses, Dr. Silbergard gave evidence that high levels of lead expo-
sure were known to cause spontaneous abortions, and Professor Brix testified on 
studies indicating that exposure to lead effected the reproductive tracts of male 
mammals. ld. at 310-12. None of the experts made any representations as to the 
level of exposure at the battery manufacturing plant and the risk that was there-
by caused. ld. Finally, Dr. Scialli and Professor Hammon opined that blood levels 
below flfty micrograms per blood deciliter would not result in abnormalities to 
offspring Id. at 311. 
47 ld. at 315. 
•• ld. at 316 . 
•• ld. 
50 Id. at 317. 
5t Id. 
52 As a result, the interim three judge panel decision was vitiated. See gener-
ally Michael Ashley Stein, Uniformity in the Federal Courts: A Proposal for In-
creasing the Use of En Bane Appellate Review, 54 U. Pl'IT. L. REv. 805 (1993). 
53 UAW v. Johnson Controls, Inc., 886 F.2d 871, 901 (7th Cir. 1989) [hereinaf-
ter Johnson Controls Seventh Circuit], rev'd 499 U.S. 187 (1991). 
54 Johnson Controls Seventh Circuit, 886 F. 2d at 885. 
55 See Hayes v. Shelby Mem'l Hosp., 726 F.2d 1543 (11th Cir. 1984); Wright 
v. Olin Corp., 697 F.2d 1172 (4th Cir. 1982). 
956 MISSISSIPPI LAW JOURNAL [Vol. 75 
mary judgment.56 This was because both parties agreed that 
there existed a substantial risk to fetuses. 57 The Seventh Cir-
cuit also dismissed the claims of the male employees, reason-
ing that the evidence presented on the risk resulting from 
their exposure was "at best, speculative and unconvincing. "58 
The Supreme Court reversed and remanded.59 Writing 
for the Court, Justice Blackmun pointed out that Johnson 
Controls' bias was obvious for it allowed men the option of 
choosing whether to endanger their reproductive health, but 
did not afford women the same option. 60 The policy had also 
discriminated on the basis of sex by excluding women of child-
bearing age from lead-exposed jobs.61 Moreover, the Seventh 
Circuit was incorrect in assuming (contrary to two other cir-
cuits), that Johnson Controls' fetal-protection policy was fa-
cially neutral, because it was applied differently for women 
than men. 62 First, the policy classified employees on the basis 
of their sex and childbearing capacities, rather than on their 
fertility. 63 Second, the defendant was concerned with the fate 
of children born only to its female employees. 64 Third, the 
policy was "facially discriminatory because it required only fe-
male employees to produce proof that they were incapable of 
reproducing."65 Nor did "the absence of a malevolent motive" 
make the policy benign or any less disparate in its impact. 66 
In addition, the appellate court applied the wrong stan-
dard in assessing the validity of Johnson Controls' 
56 Johnson Controls Seventh Circuit, 886 F.2d at 886. The court held that 
even if a BFOQ standard was applied, defendant would still be entitled to sum-
mary judgment. Id. at 888-89. 
57 Id. at 885. 
58 ld. at 889. 
56 UAW v. Johnson Controls, Inc., 499 U.S. 187, 211 (1991) [hereinafter John-
son Controls]. 
60 ld. at 197. 
61 ld. 
62 ld. at 198. 
s3 Id. 
64 Id. at 199. 
66 Id. at 198. 
66 Id. at 199. 
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exclusionary policy, for Title VII required a BFOQ, rather 
than business necessity, analysis in disparate treatment cas-
es.67 Under a BFOQ analysis, discrimination on the basis of 
sex because of safety concems was only allowable in "narrow 
circumstances.))68 To pass judicial scrutiny, an employer had 
first to demonstrate that its policy was prompted by a "high 
correlation between sex and ability to perform job functions," 
one in which "sex or pregnancy actually interferes with the 
employee's ability to perform the job.ns9 In the circumstance 
of battery manufacturing fertile women were clearly as func-
tionally capable as infertile ones, for at trial Johnson Controls 
had failed to demonstrate any "factual basis for believing" 
otherwise.70 Moreover, the "sparse record" established that 
the company was concemed with an unknown number but 
apparently "small minority of women."71 What's more, for the 
eight pregnancies previously reported at the company, no 
evidence was given that any of the babies had had their 
health affected.72 
Thus, rather than the permissible altruism of wanting to 
protect the health of unbom children, the Court reasoned that 
the exclusionary fetal-protection policy was driven by self-
serving motivations, especially evading potential tort liability. 
Thus, the policy bore a hallmark of patemalism, namely, serv-
ing the policymakers' interest while purporting to protect the 
interests of those subordinated by the policy. Further, this 
motivation was not justifiable. 73 Allowing a defendant to 
evade an antidiscrimination law "by resorting to an 
exclusionary policy" would negate both the goal and the effica-
cy of L,_ose measures.74 Nor could "the extra cost of emolov-
.. ~ 
67 Id. at 200. 
66 Id. at 202. 
69 Id. at 202, 204. 
70 I d. at 207. 
71 Id. at 206. 
72 I d. at 207. For an assessment of empirical studies relating to fetal expo-
sure, see generally ROBERT H. BLANK, FETAL PROTECTION IN THE WORKPLACE: 
WOMEN'S RIGHTS, BUSINESS INTEREST, AND THE UNBORN (1993). 
73 See Johnson Controls, 499 U.S. at 208-10. 
74 Id. at 210. 
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ing" women constitute an affirmative defense under civil 
rights statues, for after considering the issue at length, Con-
gress had decided to prohibit discrimination "despite the social 
costs associated therewith."75 
Moreover, Justice Blackmun reasoned, in each of the few 
cases where this strict standard was met (including the 
Court's ruling in Dothard v. Rawlinson,76 as well as a hand-
ful of circuit court opinions involving pregnancy exclusions),77 
the exclusion of women was justified only because of safety 
risks to third parties.78 By contrast, "[t]he unconceived fetus-
es of Johnson Controls' female employees" were not "third 
parties whose safety is essential to the business of battery 
manufacturing. "79 Noting how women had historically been 
excluded from workplace opportunity under the guise of altru-
istic concern for their well-being,80 the Court emphasized that 
it was the "individual woman's decision to weigh and accept 
the risks of employment. nat 
Thus, the ruling in Johnson Controls firmly established 
that to justify excluding women from workplace opportunities 
because of their sex, employers had first to prove such exclu-
sions actually prevented women from harming third parties. 
When the potential hazards were to their own well-being, 
women retained the autonomy of choosing whether to undergo 
those risks unless employers could also demonstrate that the 
hazards interfered with job performance. 82 
75 Id. 
78 433 u.s. 321 (1977). 
77 Johnson Controls, 499 U.S. at 202. 
78 Id. 
78 Id. at 203. 
80 Id. at 211; see supra notes 73-79 and accompanying text. 
81 Johnson Controls, 499 U.S. at 202 (citing Dothard, 433 U.S. at 335). 
82 See generally Mary Becker, Reproductive Hazards after Johnson Controls, 31 
Hous. L. REv. 43 (1994); Susan S. Grover, The Employer's Fetal Injury Quandary 
After Johnson Controls, 81 KY. L.J. 639 (1993) (analyzing an employer's dilemma 
when confronted with a conflict between state fetal tort law and federal 
anticliscrinlination law). 
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III. AUTONOMY LIMITED-CHEVRON U.S.A., INC V. ECHAZABAL 
Like women, people with disabilities have a history of 
being subjected to overprotective laws and workplace policies 
based on notions of biological incapability. 83 Congress recog-
nized this, stating in the "Findings and Purposes" section of 
the ADA that individuals with disabilities continually encoun-
ter the discriminatory effects of "overprotective rules and 
policies,7784 and have been faced with restrictions and limi-
tations "based on characteristics that are beyond the control of 
such individuals and resulting from stereotypic assumptions 
not truly indicative of the individual ability of such individu-
als to participate in, and contribute to, society."85 The first 
(and only) Rehnquist Court case to deal with the ADA and 
paternalism was Chevron U.S.A., Inc. u. Echazabal. 86 
In Echazabal, oil refinery worker Mario Echazabal was 
employed by independent contractors of Chevron from 1972 to 
1996.87 During that period he twice applied directly to Chev-
ron for a job, a prerequisite of which was to pass a physical 
examination.88 Both examinations revealed his liver to have 
abnormalities, eventually diagnosed as a Hepatitis C infec-
tion.89 Each time, Chevron's doctors asserted that 
Echazabal's liver could be harmed through continued exposure 
to toxins at the refinery, and Chevron subsequently withdrew 
83 See, e.g. ALAN GARTNER & ToM JOE, IMAGES OF THE DISABLED DISABLING 
IMAGES (1987) (demonstrating how the disabled are characterized as feeble or 
incapable, and are often objectified); PAUL LoNGMORE, WHY I BURNED MY BOOK 
AND OTHER ESSAYS ON DISABILITY 1131-148 (2003) (describing images of pity that 
Hollywood and other mass media disseminate about people with disabilities); 
Feldblum, supra note 6, at 165 (asserting that the general public's view is that 
"disabled people lack value and are to be pitied"). 
84 42 U.S.C. § 12101(a)(5) (2000). 
85 Id. at § 12101(aX7). 
88 536 U.S. 73 (2002). 
•• Id. at 76. 
88 Id. This pre-condition to employment, required of all job applicants, is au-
thorized under the ADA. 42 U.S.C. § 12112 (2000); see generally Chai R. 
Feldblum, Medical Examinations and Inquiries Under the Americans With Dis-
abilities Act: A View From the Inside, 64 TEMP. L. REv. 521 (1991). 
88 Echazabal, 536 U.S. at 76. 
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its offer of employment.90 After the second instance, Chevron 
directed the independent contractor employing Echazabal to 
either reassign him to a job where he would not be exposed to 
toxic chemicals or to make him redundant. 91 The contractor 
laid off Echazabal, who filed suit against Chevron in state 
court, alleging that the refusal to either hire him directly or 
retain him through the contractor constituted disability dis-
crimination under the ADA. 92 
Chevron removed the suit to federal court and defended 
its action under an EEOC regulation interpreting the ADA's 
defense of employees engendering a "direct threat."93 In perti-
nent part, the regulation stated that a direct threat involved 
"a significant risk of substantial harm to the health or safety 
of the individual or others," the determination of which "shall 
be based on an individualized assessment of the individual's 
present ability to safely perform the essential functions" of 
their employment. 94 
At trial, expert medical witnesses disputed whether 
Echazabal was in fact exceptionally vulnerable to toxins at 
Chevron's plant. 95 Echazabal's doctors testified that 
Chevron's assertion about Echazabal's posing a risk to himself 
was unfounded,96 and that working at the refinery placed 
9o Id. 
91 Id. 
92 /d. at 76-77. 
93 Id. at 77; 42 U.S.C. § 12113(b) (2000). 
94 29 C.F.R. § 1630.2(r) (2006). Under this regulation, this decision had to be 
based upon "reasonable medical judgment that relies on the most current medical 
knowledge and/or on the best available objective evidence" and specified four fac-
tors to be considered: "(1) [t]he duration of the risk; (2) [t]he nature and severity 
of the potential harm; (3) [t]he likelihood that the potential harm will occur; and 
(4) [t]he imminence of the potential harm." ld. 
96 Joint Appendix of Petitioner and Respondent to Chevron U.S.A, Inc. v. 
Echazabal (on file with authors) (hereinafter Joint Appendix). 
96 Testifying on behalf of Echazabal, Drs. Fedoruk and Gitnick countered 
Chevron's assertion that he would pose a risk to himself as unfounded for three 
main reasons. Id. at 99-116. First, because as a matter of general pathology, 
chronic cases of Hepatitis C of the type with which Echazabal presented could 
take decades of exposure to toxins before impairing liver function. ld. at 101, 102, 
112-114. Second, that Echazabal's albumin blood levels, "the best and only true 
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him at no greater risk than any other Chevron employees. 97 
In opposition, Chevron presented expert medical testimony 
that Echazabal had "abnormal liver function tests" consistent 
with chronic Hepatitis C, as a result of which he had a "great-
ly decreased capacity to process toxins," and therefore ought 
not to be allowed to work in the refinery.98 None of these wit-
nesses, however, was confident that Echazabal would be 
harmed through continued employment.99 Nevertheless, the 
district court granted summary judgment for Chevron, holding 
that no genuine issue of material fact had been raised as to 
whether the company had acted reasonably in relying upon its 
own doctor's assessments, regardless of their accuracy.100 
On appeal to the Ninth Circuit, the court had the parties 
brief a question not previously raised, namely whether the 
EEOC regulation, which extended the definition of direct 
threat to encompass direct threats to one's own self, was per-
missible rulemaking under the ADA.101 Holding that the 
EEOC had exceeded its authority, the Ninth Circuit reversed 
the grant of summary judgment.102 As Title I specified 
threats only to "other individuals in the workplace," the Ninth 
Circuit reasoned that the defense could not be applied to dis-
indicators of liver function," demonstrated that his "liver is functioning properly" 
so that "Echazabal is in no greater risk of injuring himself and specifically his 
lever [sic] by working in the refmery than other employee[s]." Id. at 113, 115. 
Third, that Chevron's own records indicated that none of the toxins alleged to 
endanger Echazabal were present at a level sufficient to endanger any of its 
refinery workers. Id. at 102-110 
97 ld. at 109. 
•a ld. at 41-44, 157-58, i72-73, 212 (testitnony of Drs. Baily, ~.fcGill, Bridge, 
and Tang). . 
99 For example, in cross-examination, Dr. Tang could not state with certainty 
that there was a higher than one percent chance of Echazabal being so injured, 
and that if such harm ensued, whether it would manifest in hours, months, or 
years. ld. at 83-88. 
100 Order Granting Chevron's Motion for Summary Judgment in Echazabal v. 
Chevron U.S.A, Inc. (Civil Action No. 97-CV-3498) (C.D. Cal. 1998) (hereinafter 
Echazabal District Court), reproduced in Joint Appendix, supra note 95, at 171. 
101 See Echazabal v. Chevron U.S.A., Inc., 226 F.3d 1063, 1066 n.3 (9th Cir. 
2000) (hereinafter Echazabal Ninth Circuit). 
102 ld. at 1072. It also vacated part of the judgment, and remanded the case 
back to the district court for proceedings consistent with its opinion. Id. at 1073. 
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abled workers themselves. 103 Such an interpretation conflict-
ed with the legislative history, which expressly rejected the 
use of paternalism as a means for excluding individuals with 
disabilities from the workplace. 104 It also diverged from the 
general policy, as demonstrated in Johnson Controls, of inter-
preting antidiscrimination provisions "to prohibit paternalistic 
employment" practices by allowing the protected individuals to 
choose for themselves whether to undertake risk. 105 
The Court of Appeals also rejected Chevron's argument 
that Echazabal was not "otherwise qualified" under the stat-
ute, ruling that an ability to perform the job without risking 
one's health was not an essential job function. 106 To hold oth-
erwise would allow Chevron to include any functions it chose 
in the job description, and thereby render "meaningless" the 
term "essential functions."107 Finally, the court noted that 
Chevron's apprehension about potential tort liability reflected 
a concern that hiring a worker with a disability would prove 
more costly than hiring one without a disability.108 Even if 
that were true/09 however, "[t]he extra cost of employing dis-
abled individuals does not in itself provide an affirmative 
defense to a discriminatory refusal to hire those individu-
103 Id. at 1067. 
100 Id. at 1067-68. The court quoted at length the explanation given by Senator 
Kennedy, one of the ADA's co-sponsors: 
It is important, however, that the ADA specifically refers to health and 
safety threats to others. Under the ADA, employers may not deny a 
person an employment opportunity based on paternalistic concerns re-
garding the person's health. . . . that is a concern that should rightfully 
be dealt with by the individual, in consultation with his or her private 
physician. 
Echazabal Ninth Circuit, 226 F.3d at 1067-68 (quoting 136 CONG. REc. S9684-03, 
at S9697 (1990)). 
106 Id. at 1068-69. 
106 See id. at 1070. 
107 Id. at 1071. 
108 ld. at 1070. 
109 This has never empirically been proven to be the case. In fact, existing 
studies indicate the opposite conclusion. Michael Ashley Stein, The Law and Eco-
nomics of Disability Accommodations, 53 DUKE L.J. 79, 123-141 (2003). 
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als. "110 Because the Ninth Circuit's interpretation of the 
EEOC regulation was in direct conflict with that of the Elev-
enth Circuit111 (and also opposed the understanding of the 
Seventh Circuit), 112 the Supreme Court granted 
certiorari.113 
Writing for a unanimous Supreme Court which reversed 
and remanded the case to the Ninth Circuit, Justice Souter 
reasoned that the ADA's exclusions of job-related direct 
threats were "consistent with business necessity"114 and cre-
ated "spacious defensive categories" that left the EEOC "a 
good deal of discretion" for interpreting the statute. 115 Addi-
tionally, Congress did not explicitly exclude this interpreta-
tion, a significant omission in light of the EEOC's having 
previously interpreted the same provision under the Rehabili-
tation Act to include threats to self.116 Further, Echazabal's 
argument failed because "there is no apparent stopping point" 
to its implications.117 Accordingly, the EEOC's interpretation 
was a valid one under the doctrine enunciated in another 
action involving the defendant, Chevron U.S.A., Inc. v. Natu-
ral Resources Defense Council, Inc. 118 
110 Echazabal Ninth Circuit, 226 F.3d at 1070. 
111 See Moses v. Am. Nonwovens, Inc., 97 F.3d 446, 447 (1996) (upholding the 
dismissal of an epileptic for fear that he would have a seizure and fall into roll-
ing machinery). 
112 Koshinski v. Decatur Foundry, Inc., 177 F.3d 599, 603 (1999) (permitting, 
on grounds of self-hazard, the dismissal of plaintiff with a degenerative hand 
disease who worked in close proximity to heavy machinery). 
113 534 U.S. 991 (2001). The Court did not list the questions upon which it 
granted certiorari. ld. 
114 42 U.S.C. § 12113(a) (2000). 
116 Echazabal, 536 U.S. at 78. 
116 29 U.S.C. § 794 (1974). We discuss other implications of socio-legal accre-
tions from the Rehabilitation Act, in Standing at the Crossroads, supra note 31. 
See also Michael Ashley Stein, Disability, Employment Policy, and the Supreme 
Court, 55 STAN. L. REV. 607 (2002) (reviewing RUTH O'BRIEN, CRIPPLED JUSTICE: 
THE HisToRY OF MODERN DISABILITY POLICY IN THE WORKPLACE (2001)). 
117 Echazabal, 536 U.S. at 83. Thus, "[i]f Typhoid Mary had come under the 
ADA, would a meat packer have been defenseless if Mary had sued after being 
turned away?" ld. at 84. 
118 467 U.S. 837 (1984) (articulating the standards for deference to agency 
guidelines in the face of unclear statutes). 
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The Court also reasoned that Chevron's motivations were 
reasonable: "it wishes to avoid time lost to sickness, excessive 
turnover from medical retirement or death, litigation under 
state tort law, and the risk of violating" administrative agency 
guidelines. 119 This motivation was especially pressing in re-
gard to OSHA, which fulfills its mandate to assure all workers 
"safe and healthful working conditions"120 by requiring em-
ployers to provide workplaces that are "free from recognized 
hazards that are causing or are likely to cause death or se-
rious physical harm". 121 OSHA concerns placed Chevron "at 
loggerheads" with Echazabal's interpretation of the ADA, 122 
so Chevron's decision to keep its workplace free of the kind of 
worker who could be harmed seemed reasonable.123 
Thus, the Court in Echazabal held the ADA's direct threat 
defense applicable to workers when endangered by their own 
job performance. It also differentiated this exclusion of work-
ers with disabilities from the prohibited form that had banned 
women in Johnson Controls. 124 The Court, however, declined 
to articulate under what burden employers ought to be placed 
to properly assert the affirmative defense. It also avoided the 
factual question of whether Mario Echazabal had actually 
endangered himself. 
Unlike Johnson Controls where the Court directly ad-
dressed the patemalism issue/25 it sidestepped it in 
119 Echazabal, 536 U.S. at 84. 
120 Id. (citing 29 U.S.C. § 65l(b) (2000)). 
121 Id. (citing 29 U.S.C. § 654(a)(l) (2000)). 
122 Id. at 85. 
123 In a pair of footnotes, the Court stated that it did not consider the issue of 
whether Echazabal was himself a qualified individual with a disability such that 
he could perform essential job functions. That question would only arise if the 
Ninth Circuit, on remand, concluded that Chevron's decision to exclude Echazabal 
"was not based on the sort of individualized medical enquiry required" under the 
ADA. Id. at 76 n.l. Similarly, the Court declined to "try to describe how acutely 
an employee must exhibit a disqualifYing condition before an employer may ex· 
elude him from the class of the generally qualified." Id. at 87 n.6. 
124 See id. at 86 n.5. 
126 Broadly speaking, Echazabal can be criticized on several fronts. As a mat-
ter of statutory construction, the Court's holding is curious. The Court held that 
the text of the ADA was not clear on whether the direct threat provision could 
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Echazabal, claiming that: 
[T]he EEOC's resolution [cannot] be called unreasonable as 
allowing the kind of workplace paternalism the ADA was 
meant to outlaw. The ADA was trying to get at refusals to 
give an even break to classes of disabled people, while claim-
ing to act for their own good in reliance on untested and 
pretextual stereotypes. This sort of sham protection is just 
what the regulation disallows, by demanding a particularized 
enquiry into the harms an employee would probably face. 126 
But the ADA was intended to do more than provide just an 
individualized inquiry .127 Rather, the overreaching goal of this 
civil rights statute was to prevent discrimination against peo-
refer to threat-to-self, because expresio unius exclusion alterius does not apply. See 
Echazabal, 536 U.S. at 76. The Court could easily have found otherwise by focus-
ing on a different canon of statutory instruction. See generally KARL N. 
LLEWELLYN, THE COMMON LAw TRADITION: DECIDING APPEALS 521-535 (1960). The 
text explicitly refers to "direct threat to others," 42 U.S.C. § 12113(b) (2000), and 
traditional tenets of statutory construction suggest that words should be afforded 
their plain and ordinary meaning. See American Tobacco Co. v. Patterson, 456 
U.S. 63, 68 (1982); see also LLEWELLYN, at 535. The interpretation that the Court 
adopts renders entirely meaningless the phrase "'of other individuals.m Kohnke v. 
Delta Airlines, Inc., 932 F. Supp. 1110, 1111-12 (N.D. Ill. 1996) (quoting Welsh v. 
Boy Scouts of Am., 993 F.2d 1267, 1272 (7th Cir.). The legislative history of the 
ADA refers to "direct threat" repeatedly, but never once suggests that provision 
applies to the disabled person herself. See Echazabal Ninth Circuit, 226 F.3d at 
1066-67. The Court's opinion can also be criticized from an administrative law 
perspective. Under Chevron U.S.A., Inc. v. Natural Resources Defense Council, 
Inc., 467 U.S. 837 (1984), if Congress clearly expresses its intent on an issue, the 
Court must give effect to that intent, and a court will not defer to an agency's 
construction of the statute. Id. at 842-43. Here, there is a strong argument (sup-
ported by the legislative history) that the language of the statute is clear, =d 
the EEOC regulation expanding the direct threat provision to one's self appears 
to run contrary to that intent. In other ADA cases, the Court had been perfectly 
willing to disregard EEOC regulations. See Sutton, 527 U.S. at 503-04; see also 
Rebecca Hanner White, Deference and Disability Discrimination, 99 MICH. L. REV. 
532 (2000); Theodore W. Wem, Note, Judicial Deference to EEOC Interpretations 
of the Civil Rights Act, the ADA, and the ADEA: Is the EEOC a Second Class 
Agency?, 60 OHIO ST. L.J. 1533 (1999). 
128 Chevron U.S.A., Inc. v. Echazabal, 536 U.S. 73, 75 (2002). 
127 Even on this occasion, Echazabal's doctors gave a very different account of 
the risks inherent given his liver condition. Echazabal Ninth Circuit, 336 F.3d at 
1032 (finding level of toxins present placed Echazabal at no greater risk of injury 
than other workers). 
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ple with disabilities. This aspiration included protection 
against workplace policies that impose employers' narrow ideas 
of their employees' good and thereby deprive competent dis-
abled individuals of employment opportunities.128 
That competent citizens should be free to determine and 
pursue their own good, as long as doing so does not place oth-
ers in harm's way, is a keystone of liberal democracy.129 For 
example, John Stuart Mill famously urged: 
There is no reason that all human existence should be con-
structed on some one or some small number of patterns. If a 
person possesses any tolerable amount of common sense and 
experience, his own mode of laying out his existence is the 
best, not because it is the best in itself, but because it is his 
own mode."130 
Moreover, respect for an individual's decisions regarding his or 
her own health or well being has been a fundamental right 
recognized in American jurisprudence. To quote Justice 
Cardozo's seminal remark, "[E]very human being of adult years 
and sound mind has a right to determine what should be done 
with his own body. "131 
128 42 u.s.c. § 12101(5) (2000). 
129 For a proposal about anti-paternalistic policy that extends to people with 
serious to severe intellectual disabilities, see Leslie Francis & Anita Silvers, Lib-
eralism and Individually Scripted Theories of the Good: Meeting the Challenges of 
Dependent Agency (unpublished manuscript, on me with authors). 
130 JOHN STUART MILL, ON LIBERTY 64 (1891). Mill's commitment to pleasure 
as the good is in his book, Utilitarianism: 
the theory of life on which this theory of morality is grounded-namely, 
that pleasure, and freedom from pain, are the only things desirable as 
ends; and that all desirable things (which are as numerous in the utili-
tarian as in any other scheme) are desirable either for the pleasure 
inherent in themselves, or as means to the promotion of pleasure and 
the prevention of pain. 
JOHN STUART MILL, UTILITARIANISM 8 (1895). The discussion continues with the 
argument that some pleasures are qualitatively superior to others: "It is quite 
compatible with the principle of utility to recognize the fact, that some kinds of 
pleasure are more desirable and more valuable than others. Id. at 9. 
131 Schloendorff v. Society of NY Hospital, 105 N.E. 92, 93 (NY 1914). See 
Peter H. Schuck, Rethinking Informed Consent, 103 YALE L.J. 899 (1994). 
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To understand how far the Court in Echazabal distanced 
disabled people beyond the scope of this core democratic princi-
ple, we may once more compare the circumstance of Mario 
Echazabal with that of the plaintiffs in Johnson Controls, this 
time to ask about the ways in which, although similarly situat-
ed, they were inappositely treated by the Court. 
IV. DISABILITY TERRORS AND THE RETREAT FROM AUTONOMY 
At first, similarities in the situations of the Johnson Con-
trols plaintiffs and Mario Echazabal stand out. At the time the 
decision to exclude them from working was made, each was 
biologically capable of doing the job despite having the poten-
tial to become not so. As the Johnson Controls, Court observed: 
"Fertile women, as far as appears in the record, participate in 
the manufacture of batteries as efficiently as anyone else. "132 
Similarly, Echazabal worked for a contractor at the Chev-
ron refinery, in the atmosphere supposedly toxic to him, for 
more than twenty years with no discernible harm to himself or 
his productivity, including a half decade after the initial discov-
ery of his infection. 133 There further seems to be no evidence 
related to his being Hepatitis C positive to prove that working 
would have been more damaging to Echazabal than taking 
Tylenol. The history of concem about Hepatitis C positive indi-
viduals being at risk from Tylenol is instructive here. Overdos-
es of Tylenol, or acetaminophen (the generic name), can cause 
liver damage, and on the basis of extrapolation from this fact, 
people who showed signs of Hepatitis C once were warned 
against taking acetaminophen. Subsequently, longitudinal 
studies of this group of subjects showed that even those who 
already have sustained liver damage do not appear to be at 
increased risk of further damage. 134 
132 Johnson Controls, 499 U.S. at 206. 
133 See Brief for the American Public Health Association, the American Associa-
tion for the Study of Liver Disease, the Hepatitis C Action and Advocacy Coali-
tion, the Hepatitis C Association, the Hepatitis C Outreach Project, and Lambda 
Legal Defense and Education Fund as Amici Curiae Supporting Respondent, Chev-
ron U.SA., Inc. v. Echazabal, 536 U.S. 73 (2002) (No. 00-1406), available at 
http://www .bazelon.org/publichealthbrief.html [hereinafter APHA Amicus Brief]. 
134 See DAVID H. WINSTON & DoNNA C. WINSTON, MANAGEMENT OF HEPATITIS 
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As noted in an amicus brief filed on behalf of Echazabal, 
hepatoxic chemicals such as those present at the Chevron refin-
ery cause liver damage only if present in toxic amounts, in 
which case exposure threatens liver damage in all workers 
equally.135 Here, another similarity to the Johnson Controls, 
plaintiffs is revealed. The Johnson Controls Court found that 
the exclusionary policy was not facially neutral because it did 
"not apply to male employees in the same way as it applies to 
females, despite evidence about the debilitating effect of lead 
exposure on the male reproductive system. "136 The medical 
evidence that refinery toxins are damaging to people who test 
negative and positive to Hepatitis C resembles the medical 
evidence that battery chemicals are damaging to male and 
female reproductive capabilities.137 Yet in Echazabal the 
Court did not take notice of Chevron's decision to prohibit dis-
abled workers from risking liver function for the opportunity of 
well-compensated refinery work while permitting nondisabled 
workers to take similar risks for access to this opportunity. 
Despite the potential to focus on these similarities, the 
Echazabal Court turned to dissimilarities between the cases, 
namely, to the question of who besides the plaintiff stood to be 
harmed by his presence in the workplace. In Johnson Controls 
the others at risk were believed to be the unborn, but in 
Echazabal, the class consisted of present and future workers, 
including disabled workers. 
Both sides stipulated in Johnson Controls that "there was 
a substantial risk to a fetus from lead exposure. "138 Therefore, 
BY THE PRIMARY CARE PROVIDER: MONITORING GUIDELINES 27, available at 
http://www.hcvadvocate.org/hepatitis/About_Hepatitis_pdf/1.1.2_Training_Resourc-
es/PCPP _GUIDELINES_fmal.pdf (last visited Mar. 29, 2006); see also Hepatitis C: 
Understanding the Liver, available at http://www.hepatitis.va.govlvahep?page-tp03-
01-01-90 (last visited Mar. 26, 2006). 
135 See generally APHA Amicus Brief, supra note 132. 
135 Johnson Controls, 499 U.S. at 188. 
137 Compare Joint Appendix, supra note 95, at 109 (asserting that working at 
refinery placed Echazabal at no greater risk than other workers), with Johnson 
Controls District Court, 680 F. Supp. at 310 (concluding that lead exposure could 
result in significant harm to males and females). 
135 Johnson Controls, 449 U.S. at 194. 
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fetuses were the potential recipients of harm, and the goal of 
the employer's policy was variously described as "preventing 
the health hazard to the fetus" or "protecting the unbom" and 
even as protecting "unconceived children."139 Indeed, the 
Court took safeguarding the unconceived to be the company's 
main articulated justification for the policy. The Court did not 
understand risks to the unconceived to fall under the concept of 
risks to others, especially others essential to the business of 
battery-making. 
The company was prevented from invoking any burden the 
possible limitations of a pregnant co-worker might pose for 
other employees by the terms of the 1978 Pregnancy Discrimi-
nation Act.140 Nevertheless, the company might have refer-
enced parenthood by constructing a harm-to-fellow workers 
defense and arguing the difficulties of raising children whose 
fetal development has been damaged by exposure to lead. The 
argument would be that these children would suffer from great-
er than normal illness, and less than normal capability, need-
ing extensive services from family, medical and school systems. 
Frequent absences might be expected of mothers of such chil-
dren, creating hardships for co-workers. 
That neither the Johnson Controls Court nor the defendant 
in this case cited potential harm to co-workers, despite the 
possibility of such, differentiates Johnson Controls from 
Echazabal. The Echazabal Court endorsed Chevron's reason-
able wish "to avoid time lost to sickness, [and] excessive turn-
over from medical retirement or death."141 The Court rea-
soned that even if Echazabal agreed not to hold the refinery 
liable for any liver-related illness he might develop, such ill-
ness still would impose an employee absence and tum-over 
costs on the employer. 142 Yet, nothing in Echazabal's previous 
years of work performance, in the same job at the same site, 
139 Id. at 194-95, 198; see also Johnson Controls District Court, 680 F. Supp. at 
316. 
140 42 U.S.C. § 2000e(k) (2000). 
141 Echazabal, 536 U.S. at 84. 
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demonstrated unusual sick time use, nor was there evidence in 
his prior work performance that hiring him courted the other 
problems. Had his work record raised such questions, it is 
unlikely that Chevron would have extended two offers of regu-
lar employment to him. 
From this perspective, then, the Court weighed the similar 
possibility of burdens to co-workers differently. The prospective 
harms the Court discounted in Johnson Controls are similarly 
speculative to the harms the Court took as dispositive in 
Echazabal. Yet the Justices treated permitting Echazabal to 
judge the risk of working at Chevron for himself as a great 
threat to other people. 
There is another way that Johnson Controls and Echazabal 
are inapposite. In Johnson Controls, the majority dismissed the 
importance and possibility of tort liability in the BFOQ inqui-
ry.143 In Echazabal, however, the Court viewed fear of state 
tort suits as a reason Chevron's policy was reasonable and 
legitimate.144 This demonstrates at least two ways that the 
Court views disability-based paternalism differently from that 
based on gender. First, as noted by Justice White in his concur-
rence, the majority's view in Johnson Controls seems to rest on 
the notion that women could waive tort liability on behalf of 
their unborn children.145 Although, as a matter of tort law, 
Justice White shows this to be wrong/46 assuming its correct-
ness reveals that the Court believes parents can waive tort 
liability on behalf of their unborn children but competent indi-
viduals with disabilities, like Mario Echazabal, cannot do the 
same for themselves. Second, by making tort costs irrelevant in 
,.. See Johnson Controls, 499 U.S. at 208 ("If, under general tort principles, 
Title VII bans sex-specific fetal-protection policies, the employer fully informs the 
woman of the risk, and the employer has not acted negligently, the basis for 
holding an employer liable seems remote at best."). 
1
" See Chevron, 536 U.S. at 84. 
146 See Johnson Controls, 299 U.S. at 213 (White, J., concurring). 
148 Id. ("[A]lthough warnings may preclude claims by injured employees, they 
will not preclude claims by injured children because the general rule is that par-
ents cannot waive causes of action on behalf of their children, and the parents' 
negligence will not be imputed to the children."). 
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Johnson Controls but controlling in Echazabal, the Court gives 
credence to the idea that disability discrimination is acceptable 
for economic reasons, a phenomenon commentators have re-
ferred to as "rational discrimination. "147 
During the Echazabal argument, Justice Breyer illustrated 
another dimension of the reluctance to prohibit paternalistic 
treatment of people with disabilities. He asked whether allow-
ing disabled people the autonomy to decide what risks to take 
would extend to known suicidal workers seeking the means to 
die in their workplace. 148 But nothing about Echazabal sug-
gests that a rule protecting his autonomy as a competent citi-
zen would have nearly so wide a scope. A pre-employment 
medical exam that uncovered suicidal illness in a prospective 
worker would indicate as well the individual's deficit of deci-
sional capacity. Unlike Echazabal, a suicidal patient is a gener-
al threat to himself, at risk wherever he is and not just in a 
specific workplace. In virtue of being suicidal, such a patient 
does not have decisional capacity and therefore is not compe-
tent to exercise autonomy in assuming risks. There is no record 
that suggests the ADA could preclude courts from judging a 
suicidal individual to be incompetent and therefore not suited 
to assuming risks to himself. On examination, therefore, 
Echazabal's exercising his own autonomy, weighing risks to 
himself against benefits for himself in deciding whether to take 
the Chevron job, does not put suicidal or other incompetent 
people in harm's way. 
Also during argument in Echazabal, Justice Kennedy wor-
ried about whether requiring employers to give disabled work-
ers access to environments possibly harmful to them, but safe 
for species-typical persons, might sap hard-won protective atti-
tudes.149 Here again, Echazabal's exercising autonomy to pur-
sue a benefit despite its risk is cast as prospectively harmful to 
disabled people generally. But the view that employers' concern 
147 See Aviam Soifer, Courting Anarchy, 82 B.U. L. REV. 699, 711 (2002). 
148 Dahlia Lithwick, Off With Her Scarf!, SLATE, Feb. 27, 2002, available at 
http://www.slate.com/id/2062604 (last visited Mar. 23, 2006). 
149 Id. 
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about the safety of disabled people (or about safety in general) 
will be eroded unless disabled people are banned from taking 
risks seems to applaud the kind of workplace patemalism the 
ADA was meant to outlaw. The ADA was trying to get at refus-
als to give an even break to classes of disabled people, while 
claiming to act for their own good in reliance on untested and 
pretextual stereotypes.150 Surely no even break is afforded 
when workers with disabilities who seek equal opportunity to 
work must abandon being autonomous simply to assuage 
employers' concem about their safety. Being concerned for 
employees' safety is the right thing for employers to do, both 
for nondisabled and disabled groups, but deprivation of autono-
my, and the concomitant ability to seek one's own good as one 
sees it, seems a high price to extract from just the latter group 
to induce employers to do the right thing. 
CONCLUSION 
The Rehnquist Court has taken the lead amongst the fed-
eral courts in treating disability discrimination claims as being 
of a fundamentally different stripe than those on the basis of 
race or gender. Nowhere is this more apparent than in the case 
of patemalism, which is expressly disallowed for gender but 
allowed for disability. As a result of this case, the employer was 
permitted to decide whether Mario Echazabal could risk work-
ing near toxic chemicals for the sake of an excellent income and 
benefits. 
Mario Echazabal, a person who met the legal standard of 
decisional capacity but who had a disability, was not permitted 
to decide his own good. After losing his job at the Chevron 
refinery in 1996, Echazabal finally found part-time work in late 
1998 as a school bus driver. His beginning pay was $7.00 an 
hour without benefits. His contracted job at the refinery paid 
an average of $11.50 with overtime and benefits, and the posi-
tion to which he aspired, being employed by Chevron itself, 
150 See supra note 104 and accompanying text (Ninth Circuit discussing the 
legislative history of the ADA). 
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would have averaged $17.29 an hour plus overtime and bene-
fits. lsi 
The Court compromised Echazabal's freedom to decide 
risks and benefits for himself, which is the very essence of 
being free. That the Court denied this was a case about pater-
nalism, 152 combined with the fact that this was a unanimous 
decision, portends ill for the disability antidiscrimination pro-
ject. The Court's failure to recognize the lines it is drawing and 
the effects of its decisions will be particularly harmful to work-
ers with disabilities. Not recognizing paternalistic employment 
policies as discriminatory when disabled workers alone are 
subjected to them encourages stereotyping disabled people as 
incompetent, incapable of deciding their good for themselves, 
and embeds the idea that they are inauthentic work-
ers.153 Encouraging such policies also invites the adoption of 
exclusionary workplace norms.154 This is a far cry from what 
Congress clearly hoped the ADA would accomplish. 
151 Peter Blanck, NCD Policy Brief Series: Righting the ADA-No. 9, Chevron 
v. Echazabal: The ADA's "Direct Threat to Self' Defense, available at http://www. 
ncd.gov/newsroom/publications/2003/directthreat.htm (last visited Feb. 23, 2006). 
From that point on, the story becomes even more tragic. See Peter Blanck, Jus-
tice for All? Stories About the Americans with Disabilities and Their Civil Rights, 
8 J. GENDER RACE & JUST., 1, 14 (2004) ("For Mario, the litigation was upsetting 
and unsettling. He was deprived of employment in his chosen trade, a trade he 
performed successfully for more than twenty years, because of unfounded fears 
about his health and potential liability. Mario passed away in January 2004."). 
152 See Echazabal, 536 U.S. at 75. 
153 See generally Stein, supra note 8. 
160 See Michael Ashley Stein & Michael E. Waterstone, Disability, Disparate 
Impact, and Class Actions, 56 DUKE L.J. _ (forthcoming 2006) (manuscript on 
me with authors). 
